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Can narratives of white identity reduce opposition to immigration and support for 
Hard Brexit?: a survey experiment 
 
The politics of immigration has become increasingly prominent in the West. On June 
23, 2016, in a vote driven by opposition to EU immigration (Evans and Mellon 2016a), 
Britain voted to leave the European Union. Research has consistently shown that populist 
right voting is predicted by immigration attitudes, which in turn are associated with cultural 
motivations, notably ethnic nationalism (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Citrin and Sides 
2008; Heath and Tilley 2005). Building on this, I suggest ethnic nationalists are not 
monolithic, but fall into two groups, open and closed, with the former amenable to changing 
their immigration policy preferences. This is demonstrated through a survey experiment 
which primes open ethnic nationalism to shift immigration attitudes in a liberal direction. Past 
experiments have primed nationalist sentiment to heighten opposition to immigration (i.e. 
Sniderman et. al. 2004), but none I am aware of have succeeded in reducing it. In addition to 
contributing to scholarship, the findings inform policy by suggesting new forms of political 
communication which speak to the cultural anxieties of populist right voters. 
The paper presents the results of a survey experiment conducted in Britain two 
months after the Referendum on EU membership in the midst of a debate over whether the 
country should opt for a ‘Soft Brexit,’ accepting freedom of movement from the EU in 
exchange for access to the Single Market, or ‘Hard Brexit,’ restricting freedom of movement 
at the expense of losing market access. These positions are operationalised through the use of 
a Contingent Valuation (CV) approach which asks respondents to make tradeoffs between 
personal income and immigration levels. Respondents are allocated into three groups, with 
one treatment group reading a vignette about how immigrants tend to assimilate into the 
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ethnic majority. The study examines the effect of this ‘assimilation treatment’ on the 
immigration policy preferences of respondents, focusing in particular on culturally-
conservative White British voters. 
 
National Identity and Immigration Policy Preferences 
 
This article contributes to scholarship on the relationship between national identity and 
immigration policy preferences. A considerable body of work locates an association between 
'ethnic' or exclusive definitions of the nation and opposition to immigration (Citrin et al., 
1990; Coenders 2001; Citrin et al., 2001; Heath and Tilley 2005; Citrin and Wright 2009; 
Pehrsson 2009; Wong 2010; Schildkraut 2014). A smaller number of studies seek to establish 
causal links between national identity and attitudes to immigration using survey experiments 
which prime national identity. Few of these have been able to manipulate anti-immigration 
policy preferences, as opposed to perceptions of immigrants or the number of immigrants. 
One study does however find that attitudes to minorities can be improved by priming civic 
nationalism (Charnysh et. al. 2015). Louis et. al. (2013: 131) uncover an indirect relationship 
among Australian and Canadian respondents between reading a prime on national 
identification and opposing immigration, but no unmediated effect. Wright and Citrin (2010) 
find that white American respondents respond less negatively to images of Latino protests 
when the protestors wave American rather than Mexican flags, though this does not prompt 
individuals to accept higher immigration levels. Breton (2015) shows in the Canadian case 
that reminding respondents of their national identity also has no significant effect on 
immigration attitudes. An important exception is the classic study by Sniderman et. al. 
(2004:44-5), who report that priming Dutch rather than personal identity increases anti-
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immigration sentiment - but this is true only among those with low prior hostility to 
immigration.  
 The aforementioned experimental studies treat national identity as an ordinal variable, 
but as Breton (2015:375) notes, national identity is unlikely to be unidimensional when 
multiple traditions (i.e. Smith 1997) of nationhood coexist. Recent theoretical and qualitative 
advances point to the importance of peer-to-peer emergence ‘from below’ rather than elite 
diffusion in constructing national identity (Fox 2014). If national identity is in large measure 
a complex system emerging from the disparate constructions of a pluralistic mass public, the 
content of this identity will vary between individuals and groups (Kaufmann 2016). Thus a 
nation may be ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ at once, with competing conceptions of nationhood within 
the population (Hutchinson 2005).  
Thus I focus on the more ethnic conception of the nation held by the conservative 
section of the White British majority, which differs in its symbolic-affective content from the 
civic or multicultural variants held by many minorities or white liberals. A national story of 
rising diversity may appeal to high-identifying ethnic minorities and white liberals with a 
weak sense of linked fate with other whites, but would be predicted to alienate authoritarian 
or conservative whites who identify strongly with their racial group (Stenner 2005; Feldman 
1997: 762; Jardina 2014). 
 
The UK Context 
 
 Immigration has been among the most important three issues in Britain since 2002 
according to the quarterly Ipsos-Mori Issues Index and an annual survey of Members of 
Parliament asking about the leading concerns of their constituents. In addition, the 
immigration issue rose steadily in prominence from the late 1990s, reflecting both higher net 
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migration levels – particularly from Eastern Europe – and growing media coverage of 
immigration (Ipsos-Mori 2015, p. 5). Multiculturalism, initially embraced by Tony Blair’s 
Labour government in 1997, soon fell out of favour among both centre-left and centre-right 
elites in response to a series of White-Asian riots in the so-called ‘mill towns’ of Oldham and 
Burnley in 2001. Politicians responded by talking tough on immigration and seeking to 
replace a national identity based on multiculturalism with one emphasising integration into a 
shared set of British values. The high-profile terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (US) and 
July 7, 2005 in Britain, intensified the integrationist mood. Left-wing politicians such as 
David Blunkett and Gordon Brown, as well as Conservatives such as David Cameron, 
downplayed ethnic difference and emphasised a shared civic British national identity 
(Modood 2013: 10-11; Goodhart 2013: 224)  
Immigration levels remained at historically high levels under the Cameron 
government after 2010, notwithstanding his pledge to reduce net migration from around 
300,000 to the ‘tens of thousands’ per year.1 Meanwhile, despite the shift from 
multiculturalist to civic nationalist narratives emphasising the need to integrate immigrants, 
conservative public opinion was not placated. The immigration question eventually prompted 
the country to leave the EU: not only was it the leading issue among Leave voters, but those 
motivated by hostility to immigration turned out to vote in the Referendum in significantly 
higher numbers than pro-immigration voters (Clarke, Whiteley and Goodwin 2017, ch. 7).  
Could it be that emphasising civic integration as a means of legitimating immigration 
was insufficient to allay concerns? Might the conservative swath of British public opinion be 
more invested in an ethnically-inflected sense of national identity rather than the state-defined 
nationhood championed by Brown and Cameron? This seems to have been the case (i.e. 
Heath and Tilley 2005), with the official version of national identity contested by both ethno-
                                                          
1 ‘David Cameron: net immigration will be capped at tens of thousands,’ Telegraph, 10 January 2010 
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nationalists and multiculturalists. In Britain in 2013, for instance, 51 percent of the population 
answered that having British ancestry is an important aspect of being ‘truly British’ (Park et. 
al. 2014). Among British whites the figure is 60 percent, versus only 18 percent for non-
whites. 73 percent of British whites who want immigration reduced a lot say ancestry is 
important for being truly British compared to 36 percent of whites who are comfortable with 
current or higher levels (NatCen 2016). Would the 73 percent have responded more 
favourably to a narrative of assimilation which sought to reassure them that their ethnic 
boundaries were secure despite immigration? This is one question this article seeks to 
address. 
 
Open Ethnic Nationalism and Immigration Preferences 
 
It is vital to unpack the idea of national identity to concentrate explicitly on dominant 
ethnic groups, which in most western countries consist of a white ethnic majority which 
considers itself to have founded the nation-state (Kaufmann 2004). Conservative dominant 
group members assert a proprietary claim to national membership which may shape their 
attitudes to the boundaries of ‘we’, and, by extension, toward immigration. A number of 
studies prime American dominant ethnicity. For instance, Brader, Valentino and Suhay 
(2008), and Hopkins and Hainmueller (2015) find that white respondents reduce their 
opposition to immigrants when immigrant profiles are European rather than non-European.  
Yet even majority ethnicity contains its ‘open’ and ‘closed’ variants: ethnic 
boundaries vary in exclusivity. In some locales, such as northern India or Northern Ireland, 
ethnic boundaries are tight, with strong sanctions against intermarriage. Elsewhere - notably 
in the Caribbean or Latin America where typologies of race are fluid, or in sub-Saharan 
Africa where minorities often assimilate into dominant groups such as the Wolof, Baganda or 
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Kikuyu - boundaries are more permeable (Wimmer 2007). The definition of who is included 
may also vary over time and place (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2006). For Richard Alba, the 
boundary between Hispanic and White Americans is more permeable than that between 
European ethnic majorities and Muslim groups (Alba 2005). Ethnicity is defined by a belief 
in common ancestry (Francis 1976: 2-9; Smith 1991), but those who trace shared ancestry 
along one line may nevertheless embody considerable admixture on other lines through 
intermarriage. As a result, ethnic groups may differ internally in ‘racial’ appearance (i.e. 
Jews, Uighurs, Native Americans or Pashtuns).  
Accordingly we may speak of open and closed forms of ethnic majoritarianism, with 
open ethnic majorities secure about their capacity to assimilate immigrants while closed 
majorities insist on exclusion. A classic example of an ethnic group which oscillated between 
open and closed self-conceptions are American White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). As 
John Higham notes of the period from 1865-1890, ‘the Anglo-Saxonists were pro rather than 
con. During an age of confidence almost no race-thinker directly challenged a tolerant and 
eclectic attitude toward other European groups. Instead, Anglo-Saxon and cosmopolitan 
nationalisms merged in a happy belief that the Anglo-Saxon has a marvellous capacity for 
assimilating kindred races, absorbing their valuable qualities, yet remaining essentially 
unchanged’ (Higham 1955: 33). Only when this confidence flagged, Higham writes, did 
immigration restriction rise up the political agenda. Note that open ethnic majoritarianism is 
distinct from civic nationalism in that the former seeks to preserve an ethnic majority, or 
descent community, rather than accept a multi-ethnic form of nationhood based solely on 
state institutions and values. For open ethnic nationalists, majority ethnicity remains a key 
component of nationhood, but its boundaries are maintained partly through marital and 
‘identificational’ assimilation (Gordon 1964). 
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Priming Open Ethnic Nationalism 
 
The strategy of this paper is to variously prime civic nationalism, the contemporary 
centrist narrative, and open ethnic nationalism, to see if this distinction produces disparate 
effects on immigration attitudes and right-wing populism. A narrative of growing ethnic 
diversity coupled with economic strength should be endorsed by civic, but not by ethnic, 
nationalists - whether of the open or closed variety. Alternatively, a vignette about successful 
assimilation into the ethnic majority should reassure open but not closed ethnic nationalists. 
Vignettes draw the attention of white respondents to processes of continuity – maintaining 
boundaries through assimilation - or, alternatively, change - immigration causing group 
decline. From a distance, a river is timeless, but up close it is constantly changing: you cannot 
put your foot in the same water twice. Directing an ethnonationalist individual to step back 
and appreciate ethnic continuity through assimilation should reassure while drawing their 
focus to fast-flowing changes and white decline should prompt insecurity.  
A psychological study which partly embodies this approach, by Craig and Richeson 
(2014), finds that priming white Americans about the impending demise of the white majority 
moves opinion in a more conservative direction across both ‘race-related’ and race-neutral 
issues. Major et. al. (2016) show that high-identifying whites who read an article about 
America losing its white majority in 2042 become more opposed to immigration and more 
supportive of Donald Trump. Low-identifying whites had the opposite response, becoming 
less supportive of Trump when primed.  
In addition to testing threat responses to a diversification story, a replication of 
previous work, this paper tries to determine whether a reassuring narrative of assimilation 
may have the opposing effect among white conservatives. As noted, I could find no studies 
showing a liberalising effect on conservative white immigration policy preferences. This may 
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be because immigration preferences represent hard-to-shift 'strong attitudes' which lead 
respondents to avoid or ignore information which fails to confirm prior opinions (Druckman 
and Leeper 2012: 877). In line with this ‘motivated reasoning’ perspective, several studies 
which test whether correcting respondents' misperceptions about the actual number of 
immigrants affects their immigration policy preferences report no significant effects 
(Lawrence and Sides 2014; Hopkins, Sides and Citrin 2016).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
The literature on ethnic boundaries and the cultural sources of immigration opinion leads to 
the following expectations: 
 
H1 Those reading a diversification story should become more opposed to immigration 
because it primes anxiety about group decline. Immigration should increase in salience and 
support for right-wing populism should rise. 
 
H2 Those reading the assimilation story should become more relaxed about immigration 
because they perceive that majority ethnic boundaries can be maintained through assimilating 
immigrants. The salience of immigration and right-wing populist views should decrease. 
 
Given the literature on authoritarianism, conservatism and open ethnic nationalism, we 
should also expect that: 
 
H3 Conservatives, authoritarians and ethnic nationalists will respond more strongly to both 
primes in the directions given in H1 and H2.  
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It could be the case that conservatives and authoritarians are closed rather than open ethnic 
nationalists, in which case: 
 
H4 The diversity treatment will increase conservative and authoritarian anti-immigration 
sentiment, salience and populist right support but the assimilation treatment will have no 
effect 
 
 
Data and Method 
 
Data come from a survey fielded by the survey firm YouGov which took place on August 16-
17, 2016 and consisted of 1677 adults, of which 1485 were from the White British ethnic 
majority. Respondents are selected from YouGov’s online panel and weighted according to 
age, education, region, class and voting criteria listed in Appendix 4. Full question wording is 
provided in Appendix 3.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Participants were first asked a series of standard items, including demographics, party 
identification, past voting behaviour (including EU referendum vote in Britain), and self-
placement on a left-right scale. This was followed by two items tapping authoritarianism, and 
one measuring conservatism. The first is a relatively unobtrusive authoritarianism question, 
part of a longstanding 4-item childrearing authoritarianism scale (Feldman and Stenner 1997; 
Stenner 2005; Perez and Hetherington 2014): ‘Please tell me which one you think is more  
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important for a child: 1) To be considerate; 2) To be well-behaved.’ The second is more 
explicit, drawing on another long-used item deployed by the survey firm Cultural Dynamics 
(Rose 2011): ‘How well does this describe the REAL you? : “I believe that sex crimes, such 
as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment. I think that such 
criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.” ’Answers range from 1-Not at all like me, 
to 6-Very much like me. A third item focuses on conservatism, as distinct from 
authoritarianism (Stenner 2005), asking respondents to indicate their views on the statement 
‘Things in Britain were better in the past.’ Response categories run from 1-Strongly agree to 
5-Strongly disagree.  
 
Treatments 
 
Thereafter, respondents are randomly allocated into three groups: two treatments and a 
control condition. Treatment groups read one of the two vignettes in Appendix 3 before 
answering three questions on immigration. The vignettes are designed to be realistic 
alternative national identity narratives which political parties or media commentators could 
potentially adopt. As such, treatments are designed to convey a holistic, positive message 
rather than merely maximising the manipulation of the outcome variable or deploying a 
conjoint strategy. The two narratives tell very different stories about the relationship between 
immigration and majority ethnic boundaries. The first treatment, the ‘diversity prime,’ 
stresses change, urging ethnic majority respondents to embrace it, accept their group’s ethnic 
decline, and focus instead on the ethnically-neutral civic nation-state as the embodiment of 
their collective identity: 
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Britain is changing, becoming increasingly diverse. The 2011 census shows that 
White British people are already a minority in four British cities, including London. 
Over a quarter of births in England and Wales are to foreign-born mothers. Young 
Britons are also much more diverse than older Britons. Just 4.5 percent of those older 
than 65 are nonwhite but more than 20 percent of those under 25 are. Minorities' 
younger average age, somewhat higher birth rate and continued immigration mean 
that late this century, according to Professor David Coleman of Oxford University, 
White British people will be in the minority nationwide. We should embrace our 
diversity, which gives Britain an advantage in the global economy. Together, we can 
build a stronger, more inclusive Britain. 
 
 The second, ‘assimilation prime,’ stresses continuity over change, seeking to reassure 
white respondents that immigration will leave the boundaries and size of the majority group 
unaffected. This is intended to prime an open ethnic nationalism rather than either civic 
nationalism or exclusive ethnic nationalism.  
 
Immigration has risen and fallen over time, but, like the English language, Britain's 
culture is only superficially affected by foreign influence. According to Professor Eric 
Kaufmann of the University of London, a large share of the children of European 
immigrants have become White British. Historians tell us that French, Irish, Jews and 
pre-war black immigrants largely melted into the white majority. Those of mixed 
race, who share common ancestors with White British people, are growing faster than 
all minority groups and 8 in 10 of them marry whites. In the long run, today's 
minorities will be absorbed into the majority and foreign identities will fade, as they 
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have for public figures with immigrant ancestors like Boris Johnson or Peter 
Mandelson. Britain shapes its migrants, migration doesn't shape Britain. 
 
Notice that the treatments are based on the view that national identity is a complex system in 
which different actors perceive the nation differently. This means testing for disparate 
impacts of the vignettes across a fine-grained set of group characteristics. Given the need for 
a realistic set of national/policy narratives, and the importance of achieving adequate degrees 
of freedom to test small groups (i.e. UKIP voters, tabloid readers), this paper does not adopt a 
conjoint technique nor does it test fragments of the narratives - though this is a potential route 
for future researchers to follow. Randomisation tests in Appendix 2 show that treatment 
groups do not differ from control groups across key demographic or attitudinal 
characteristics.2  
 
Dependent variables 
 
The first outcome measure is a standard policy preference item which asks ‘Do you think the 
number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, reduced or should it 
remain the same?’ Answers are arrayed on a 1-5 Likert scale from ‘increase a lot’ to ‘reduce 
a lot’ with 'don't know' responses removed. The second, measuring the salience of 
immigration reads: ‘What do you see as the most important issue facing Britain today?’ 
Respondents select from ten options. One of these is immigration. Those selecting 
immigration as their most important concern are coded 1 and all others 0 to create an 
immigration salience dummy.  
                                                          
2 The one partial exception is the ‘better in the past’ variable for the diversity treatment. 
However, the null result I find for H1 in figures 1-4 is robust to the inclusion of this predictor. 
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To get at more current expressions of anti-immigration populism, British respondents are 
asked a Contingent Valuation (CV) question designed to probe their willingness to trade 
access to the economic benefits of the European Single Market against openness to the free 
movement of people from the EU to Britain. As one is currently viewed by the EU as a 
condition for the other, there is a debate between proponents of ‘Hard Brexit,’ who prefer 
border control and sharply reduced EU immigration even if this means losing Single Market 
access – and thus revenue, and ‘Soft Brexit,’ whereby access to the Single Market is retained 
in exchange for permitting the free movement of people from the EU. This is, for example, 
the relationship Norway has with the EU.  
Rather than a more abstract policy question, this item is designed to probe people's 
willingness to make sacrifices in the event of a costly Brexit. This said, the question pertains 
to immigration and thus is expected to overlap with previous immigration questions given 
that nearly half the UK inflow stems from the European Union. The CV question reads: 
‘Roughly 185,000 more people entered Britain last year from the EU than went the other 
way. Imagine there was a cost to reduce the inflow. How much would you be willing to pay 
to reduce the number of Europeans entering Britain?’ Respondents are asked what proportion 
of their income they would be willing to pay, from nothing, in which case numbers remain at 
185,000, to 5 percent, which would reduce numbers to zero. Each additional percentage of 
income foregone reduces EU migration by 35,000.  
For all questions, a 'don’t know' option is provided. For the authoritarianism, 
conservatism and immigration questions, the order of responses is randomized to prevent 
response-order bias. Unless indicated, I use logistic regression to analyse immigration 
salience and ordered logistic regression for the immigration attitudes and CV measures. 
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Results 
 
 I begin by examining the effect of the assimilation and diversity primes on 
immigration opinion, salience and the CV (EU immigration tradeoff) question in Britain. The 
focus is on the White British ethnic majority as the vignettes are designed around the 
assumption that conservative and authoritarian members of the ethnic majority are concerned 
about maintaining symbolic boundaries and numerical preponderance. Figure 1 shows the 
percentage in each treatment group who favour reduced immigration as opposed to current or 
higher levels. Those reading the story about ethnic assimilation are six points less likely than 
those reading the diversity vignette and four points less likely than those in the control group 
to want lower levels of immigration. A chi-squared test of the three conditions cross-
tabulated with immigration attitudes is significant at the p<.05 level. However, further 
comparisons reveal that the only statistically significant difference is between those receiving 
the assimilation prime and the rest. 
When we expand the binary immigration reduction variable into its full 5-point form, 
from ‘increase a lot’ (1) to ‘reduce a lot’ (5), the White British mean score on the 
immigration levels question is 4.06 for the control group, 4.09 for the diversity prime and 
3.99 for the assimilation prime. Across the 5-point immigration levels variable, the difference 
between those receiving the assimilation and diversity primes is strongly significant (p=.001) 
as is the difference between the assimilation treatment group and the control group (p=.006). 
This appears to be one of the first cases of where an experimental treatment has resulted in a 
significant liberal shift in whites’ immigration policy attitudes (for discussion, see Hopkins, 
2016). 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
*p=.033, two degrees of freedom. 
 
This offers weak confirmation of H1 regarding the diversity prime, but strong confirmation 
for H2 – that assimilation primes will shift attitudes in a liberal direction - thereby refuting the 
claim that strong beliefs cannot be experimentally manipulated. Yet the effect does not 
significantly vary between white liberals, conservatives, libertarians or authoritarians. This 
thereby fails to disprove the null hypothesis for H3 and H4.  
I next consider the question of Hard versus Soft Brexit through the CV measure for 
Hard Brexit support. The Hard Brexit proxy question is phrased as a tradeoff between 
European immigration and personal prosperity, with each 1 percent of income ‘purchasing’ a 
decline in European immigration of 35,000. 60 percent of White British respondents who 
answered the question would rather accept the then-current level of  185,000 EU (net) 
immigrants per year than sacrifice any of their income to reduce EU immigration. Figure 2 
reveals that over 80 percent of White British individuals in the survey would prefer to accept 
current migration levels than to pay 5 percent of their income. 60 percent would not pay 
anything to reduce numbers, rising to 62 percent when including minorities, who were more 
likely to vote to remain in the EU. The sample is skewed 56-44 towards Remain compared to 
the actual 48-52 result, thus understates the population-level willingness to pay to reduce 
immigration. Yet even with Brexit weighting, a majority are unwilling to pay anything to 
lower EU immigration. 
Past research using the CV method suggests the share willing to pay should be 
considered an upper bound, with participants often unwilling to contribute as much in reality 
as they state on surveys (Loomis et. al. 1996). Even taking into account the 
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underrepresentation of Leave voters in the survey, this indicates that the centre of gravity of 
British opinion leans closer to the Soft Brexit position.3 Even among White British 
respondents who voted Leave, nearly 30 percent indicated they would not be willing to 
sacrifice any of their income to reduce European immigration. Again, this suggests a 
considerable ‘soft’ component to the Brexit vote. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
*p=.025, two degrees of freedom. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, however, 26 percent of the sample indicated they would 
contribute at least 3 percent of their income to reduce European migration, rising to 54 
percent among those voting Leave. Indeed, 35 percent of Leave voters said they were willing 
to pay 5 percent of their income to cut EU immigration to zero. Coding responses from 1, 
unwilling to pay anything, through 6, willing to pay 5 percent, yields an ordinal variable for 
analysis. Given the non-normally distributed nature of this measure, I have also transformed 
it into a dummy variable, with the willingness to pay a full 5 percent of income coded 1 and 
other responses 0.  
I find White British respondents who read the assimilation prime become about a half 
standard deviation less likely to endorse the hard Brexit proxy than those in the control or 
diversity treatment groups. As figure 3 shows, the share willing to pay 5 percent falls from 
                                                          
3 This may overstate the case somewhat because 41 percent of Leave voters gave a ‘don’t 
know’ answer to the tradeoff question as against 27 percent of those who reported voting 
Remain. 
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18.8 percent in the control group to 11.8 percent with the assimilation treatment, which is 
significant in a chi-squared test at the p<.05 level. This again confirms H2 – regarding the 
predicted response to the assimilation vignette - while H1 and H4 (which predict the diversity 
prime will enhance opposition to immigration) is refuted. 
However, most liberal-minded people are already unwilling to pay any of their 
income to reduce EU migration. Indeed, as figure 3 shows, it is conservative and 
authoritarian respondents who respond most to the assimilation prime by softening their 
willingness to pay to halt EU migration. Thus UKIP, authoritarian or lower status (C2, D and 
E occupations) respondents are more affected by the assimilation prime than the more liberal, 
libertarian or elite group. This backs H3, contrary to the results for immigration levels in 
figure 2 where there were no differences between liberals and conservatives.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
For instance, of the 145 White British people who voted for the UK Independence 
Party in 2015, a majority - 55.3 percent - of the control group are willing to pay 5 percent, but 
just 32.4 percent of the assimilation treatment group are. Thus the model in figure 4 shows 
that among White Britons, UKIP voters are predicted to be 25 points more likely than non-
UKIP voters to pay 5 percent to reduce EU immigration to zero. Within the assimilation 
treatment group, UKIP and non-UKIP white voters differ by just 11 points compared to a 33-
point UKIP/non-UKIP divide on the 5 percent question within the other treatment groups. 
The interaction between the assimilation treatment and UKIP voting on this Hard Brexit 
measure is significant and negative at the p<.05 level. This suggests that priming open ethnic 
nationalism brings UKIP voters more in line with the mainstream of White British opinion. 
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[Figure 4 here] 
 
For Brexit voters, 40.9 percent of the control group are willing pay 5 percent to end EU 
immigration, but this falls to 26.5 percent for the assimilation treatment group. Among the 
332 White British respondents in the C2, D and E census social grades (skilled and unskilled 
working class and unemployed), the assimilation vignette reduces the willingness to pay 5 
percent of income from 31.2 percent to 13.9 percent, which is significant at the p<.01 level. 
These are dramatic effects, especially when set in the context of previous survey work on 
immigration attitudes (i.e. Hopkins, Sides and Citrin 2016; Druckman and Leeper 2012). The 
policy takeaway is that those trying to convince the conservative section of the British public 
of the merits of trading away reduced migration for greater access to EU markets can benefit 
from making the case that European immigrants are likely to assimilate and become ‘us’, 
now as in the past. 
These results offer partial support for the view that primes are operating in the 
expected – different - directions, insofar as those reading the assimilation prime respond 
differently from those reading the diversity prime. However, the diversity vignette does not 
produce a significant increase in the Hard Brexit proxy, even among conservatives and 
authoritarians. One possibility is that respondents have already internalized a narrative of 
demographic decline, hence the diversity vignette adds little to their perceptions. Indeed, the 
British public believes that EU immigrants make up 15 percent of Britain’s population. Leave 
voters estimate this figure to be as high as 20 percent, compared to the actual figure of 5 
percent (Duffy and Menon 2016).4  
                                                          
4 https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3742/the-perils-of-
perception-and-the-eu.aspx 
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Moving to the salience of immigration, our final dependent variable, it is readily 
apparent that those who cite immigration as their top concern are drawn almost entirely (97 
percent) from among those who want less immigration. We saw that the assimilation prime 
reduces opposition to immigration, but does it similarly lower the salience of this issue 
among immigration opponents? Only weakly. Among White British in the sample who want 
immigration reduced a lot, the share citing immigration as their most important concern is 45 
percent for the diversity treatment, 40 percent for the assimilation treatment and 42 percent 
for the control group. Results are in the right direction but not statistically significant. One 
possibility is that ceiling effects are limiting the impact of the treatments in raising awareness 
of immigration among anti-immigration respondents because half of anti-immigration White 
Britons already rate it as their top issue.  
 
Relevance for Public Policy  
 
Models of reported Brexit vote, shown in table 1, confirm findings from the academic 
literature which claim that values and cultural issues are more important than personal 
economic circumstances in accounting for opposition to immigration and support for the 
populist right (Sniderman et. al. 2004; Mudde 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 2015; 
Norris and Inglehart 2016).5  
 
[table 1 here] 
 
In view of the association between cultural attitudes and populist right support, economic 
policies, such as Britain's Controlling Migration Fund – designed to provide resources to 
                                                          
5 See table 1 for models of Brexit support.  
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districts such as Boston in Lincolnshire which are coping with a large influx (and which 
delivered the strongest Leave vote)  - may prove ineffective (DCLG 2016). After all, only a  
handful of the 335 districts of England and Wales have experienced large-scale immigration 
like Boston. Likewise, Centre-Left parties may have difficulty addressing the immigration 
question with economic policy proposals. This paper therefore suggests that political 
communications which reframe the relationship between immigration and national identity 
stand a better chance of addressing the cultural grievances driving the populist right.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper finds that priming open ethnic nationalism through an assimilation 
treatment reduces White British opposition to immigration and lowers white conservatives' 
willingness to pay for Hard Brexit. The novelty of the assimilation message in Britain and its 
absence of liberal connotations may help to account for its ability to shift conservative 
opinion. This suggests that changing the way immigrants are perceived in relation to the 
ethnonational ‘we’ is important for addressing the concerns of conservative whites which 
underpin right-wing populism. This work adds a new perspectives to the growing literature 
on the relationship between national identity and immigration attitudes. It advances our 
understanding of public opinion on immigration and the sources of right-wing populism. 
Future work could employ a conjoint method to see which parts of the assimilation narrative 
contribute most to the effects noticed here. In addition, the study might be replicated in cases 
outside Britain. 
How might the results of this survey experiment inform the policy process? The 
vignettes are designed as realistic forms of political communication that policymakers, 
politicians or the media may adopt. The narrative treatments show that priming a more open 
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form of ethnic nationalism is an effective strategy for reassuring conservative white voters. 
This means the assimilation narrative has the potential to bring conservative British opinion 
toward the centre ground, reducing the political divisions that produced the Brexit vote. 
Liberals, Soft Brexit campaigners and free-market conservatives in Britain should think 
seriously about changing their political communications with conservative White British 
audiences. The current Soft Brexit narrative, which champions the merits of diversity and 
economic openness as key features of a civic British nationalism is, as Stenner (2005: 331) 
might have predicted, failing to carry authoritarian and conservative audiences. A more 
promising approach could be to reserve this account for liberal or minority constituencies 
while developing an assimilationist ‘things remain the same’ appeal to conservative ‘Middle 
Britain.’ When communicating with the nation more broadly, a ‘constructively ambiguous’6 
form of national imagining, which provides room for liberals and conservatives to read their 
chosen narrative into the script, is preferable.  
By subtly altering the boundaries of ‘us’ to include immigrants who wish to 
assimilate, this strategy ministers to authoritarian concerns (Stenner 2005: 328). Against this, 
populist right parties such as the UK Independence Party will no doubt wish to keep the 
diversity narrative at the centre of their messaging in order to maximise ethnonationalist 
concerns. 
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